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Abstract—Privacy protection in published data sets is of crucial
importance, and anonymisation is one well-known technique for
privacy protection that has been successfully used in practice.
However, existing anonymisation frameworks have in mind spe-
cific data structures (i.e., tabular data) and, because of this, these
frameworks are difficult to apply in the case of RDF data. This
paper presents an RDF anonymisation framework that has been
developed to address the particularities of the RDF specification.
Such framework includes an anonymisation model for RDF data,
a set of anonymisation operations for the implementation of such
model, and a metric for measuring precision and distortion of
anonymised RDF data. Furthermore, this paper presents a use
case of the proposed RDF anonymisation framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large quantities of data are gathered and published every
day by public and private companies and institutions. One key
aspect of data publishing is the protection of the privacy of
entities of interest (e.g., individuals), and failure to ensure the
privacy can not only harm the reputation of a publisher, but can
also compromise the privacy of entities of interest by making
their private information available to third parties.
Ensuring the privacy of data while preserving data usefulness
is not a simple task. Usually, removal of the data that explicitly
identify the entity of interest, such as social security numbers
or telephone numbers, does not alone ensure privacy since the
remaining data can often be linked to other published data and
used for identification purposes [1]. For example, Sweeney
showed in an experiment that 87% of the U.S. population is
likely to be uniquely identified based only on a combination
of a ZIP code, gender, and date of birth [2].
Anonymisation is one technique for privacy protection that
has been successfully applied in practice, and a number of
anonymisation frameworks have been developed to this date.
However, these frameworks are developed having in mind
specific data structures, such as tabular data, and they are
difficult to apply for the anonymisation of data that have
different structures and formats. This is the case of RDF
(Resource Description Framework) [3] data.
With the increasing amount of RDF data being published in
the Web (usually as Linked Data), privacy issues are expected
to emerge. Furthermore, privacy concerns hinder the publication
of Linked Data in different sectors (e.g., healthcare, energy)
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where the re-identification of individuals or other entities of
interest can lead to social or legal issues.
This paper presents a framework for the anonymisation of
RDF data. Such framework describes an anonymisation model
for RDF data called k-RDFanonymity, as well as anonymisation
operations for the implementation of the mentioned model and a
metric for measuring the precision and distortion of anonymised
RDF data. Furthermore, this paper also presents a use case of
the presented RDF anonymisation framework.
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II
describes related work, while Section III presents the framework
for the anonymisation of RDF data. Section IV presents a use
case of such framework and, finally, Section V draws some
conclusions and includes ideas for future work.
II. RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
This section gives a brief description of related work. First,
we describe the foundations of data anonymisation frameworks.
Afterwards, we describe RDF and its particularities that are of
interest for data anonymisation.
A. Data Anonymisation Frameworks
Anonymisation is a widely accepted and used framework
for privacy-preserving data publishing that aims to ensure the
privacy of data and balance data analysis and utility [4].
In privacy-preserving data publishing, there are several data
attributes of the entity of interest that are taken into account:
• Explicit identifiers are attributes that explicitly identify
the entity of interest (e.g., identifier of a person, property
number of a building).
• Quasi identifiers (QIDs) are sets of attributes that can
potentially identify the entity of interest. Usually, those
are the attributes whose values can be found in other data
sets and that can be then used for identification purposes (it
is important to note that each attribute in a quasi identifier
does not alone identify an entity of interest).
• Sensitive attributes are those attributes that describe some
sensitive information about the entity of interest (e.g.,
salary, disease).
• Non-sensitive attributes are all attributes which do not
belong to any of the previous categories.
Explicit identifiers, QIDs, and sensitive attributes can be
considered to be private attributes of the entity of interest.
Non-sensitive attributes are not considered to be a privacy
issue.
To illustrate these attributes, we present an example of a
medical records with data about patients and their diseases
(Table I). There are no definitive guidelines on how to properly
classify attributes, so the classification can be a difficult
task. The attributes present in our example data set can be
classified as follows: Id is an explicit identifier since it can
explicitly identify the patient that a record belongs to; a set
of attributes {Job, Age} is a quasi identifier (QID) since it can
be expected that the same set of attributes can appear in some
other data set that can also contain additional data (but not
diseases) that are sufficient for patient identification (e.g., name
and surename); Disease is a sensitive attribute since it gives
sensitive information about patients.
TABLE I: Example of patients’ medical records data.
Id Job Age Disease
1872 Teacher 24 HIV
1352 Lawyer 28 Flu
1453 Musician 32 Flu
1389 Writer 35 HIV
1463 Writer 36 HIV
1305 Lawyer 22 Flu
1435 Teacher 25 HIV
1058 Musician 38 Flu
Data anonymisation implies that explicit identifiers must
be removed from the data set [4] and that the original
QIDs are anonymised. Different anonymisation models have
been developed having in mind tabular data structures (e.g.,
k-anonymity [5], l-diversity [6]), and these anonymisation
models can be implemented by applying various anonymisation
operations [4]:
• Suppression is a technique in which one or more values
in a data set are removed or replaced with some special
value, while removed or replaced values are not disclosed.
• Generalisation is a technique that transforms values into
more general values, i,e., into new values that are less
precise but still consistent with the original ones.
• Anatomisation implies that the relationship between the
quasi identifiers and the sensitive values is removed, while
the data is not modified. This is achieved by separating the
data related to quasi identifiers from the data containing
sensitive values and by providing the relationship between
the two data sets by introducing an identifier.
• Perturbation is a technique in which the original data
are replaced with noise or synthetic data in such a way
that statistical analyses based on the perturbed data do
not significantly differ from the statistical analysis of the
original data [4]. Unlike previous techniques, perturbation
does not preserve the truthfulness of the data and the
perturbed data do not correspond to real world entities.
Anonymisation models and anonymisation operations are
integral parts of a data anonymisation framework. By applying
anonymisation operations, an anonymisation model is imple-
mented and thus, the privacy of entities of interest in a data
set is ensured. Furthermore, a data anonymisation framework
specifies various metrics for measuring the distortion and
usefulness of anonymised data (e.g., precision and minimal
distortion [7], [8]).
B. Anonymisation in Resource Description Framework
RDF is a specification for describing resources on the Web,
where resources can be anything including documents, objects,
people, or abstract concepts [3]. Unlike in tabular data formats
(e.g., databases), where existing anonymisation frameworks
have been successfully applied to this date, data in RDF are
structured in a different manner as a graph.
The key concept in RDF is an RDF statement (s,p,o), also
called an RDF triple, which consists of a subject, a predicate,
and an object, and which encodes a claim about the world.
Each RDF triple implies the existence of a relationship that
holds between two resources denoted by a subject and an
object. Relationships in RDF triples are denoted by a predicate,
also called a property, and are directed from subject to object.
While in tabular data formats attribute values of entities
of interest are stored in columns, attribute values of entities
of interest described in RDF appear as resources, either as
IRIs or as literals, that describe these entities of interest. In
an RDF graph, literals appear only as objects, while IRIs
can appear in several places: as subjects, as predicates, or as
objects. Therefore, attribute values of entities of interest can
have different forms and can appear in different places in the
RDF descriptions of these entities of interest.
In an RDF graph, resources can be classified according
to categories specified by classes that belong to a specific
vocabulary. Vocabularies are used in combination with RDF
for providing semantic information about resources, and are
defined using a specific language (e.g., RDF Schema or OWL).
Relationships between an RDF resource and its class are defined
through an rdf:type property. These relationships also describe
resources in RDF.
The particularities of the RDF model imply difficulties in the
direct application of existing anonymisation frameworks, which
were developed having in mind different data structures and
formats. Therefore, in order to successfully anonymise RDF
data, anonymisation frameworks that address the particularities
of RDF are needed. Although some effort in this direction
exists [9], it addresses only generalisation and suppression, and
it does not include any anonymisation metrics.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANONYMISATION OF RDF
DATA
This section describes a framework for the anonymisation
of RDF data. Such framework is based on existing anonymi-
sation frameworks and has been specifically defined to take
into account the particularities of the RDF specification. It
consists of an anonymisation model, of a set of anonymisation
operations, and of an anonymisation metric adapted to fit the
RDF specification.
A. Privacy-related Entity Attributes in RDF
One characteristic of RDF, which is of relevance for the
problem of anonymisation, is that entity attribute values can
appear in different places and forms in the description of
resources that represent entities of interest. Because of this,
privacy-related attributes in RDF are more difficult to identify
and addressing the privacy of RDF data can be a complex task.
In the RDF description of entities of interest, values of
privacy-related entity attributes (explicit identifiers, quasi
identifiers, and sensitive attributes) can appear in:
• Resource IRI. Values for all three types of attributes can
appear in the IRI of a resource, exposing them to humans.
• Datatype property value. Values for all three types of
attributes can appear as literals in datatype property values
in a resource description (object in a statement).
• Object property value. Values for all three types of
attributes can appear as IRIs in object property values in
a resource description (object in a statement).
• Property IRI. Values for attributes that belong to quasi
identifiers and for sensitive attributes can appear in the IRI
of a property in a resource description. Having explicit
identifiers appear as property IRIs is not expected.
• Related resource. Values for all three types of attributes
can also appear in more complex scenarios in the de-
scription of resources that are related to resources that
represent entities of interest through RDF properties. In
this case, values can appear in all scenarios presented
above: in resource IRI, datatype property value, object
property value, property IRI, or another related resource.
Next, we present an example of the previous scenarios1 (Listing
1) in which the first record from Table I is described in RDF
using the Turtle syntax. In this example, the identifier appears
in the resource IRI, the age appears as a datatype property
value, the job appears as an object property value, and the
disease appears as a property IRI.
1 <http://example.com/resource/Person/1872> a foaf:Person;
2 foaf:age "24"; ex:hasJob ex:Teacher; ex:hasHIV "true".
Listing 1: Example of a patient’s medical record in RDF.
B. RDF Anonymisation Model
This section presents an anonymisation model for RDF,
called k-RDFanonymity. This model is inspired by the k-
anonymity model [1], [5] developed by Samarati and Sweeney
for the anonymisation of tabular data.
Definition 1. A subgraph Gr of an RDF graph G (Gr ∈ G)
describes an entity of interest represented by a resource r if Gr
is the union of all the subgraphs of G that include information
about attributes that describe the entity of interest represented
by r, regardless of whether r is the subject or the object of
statements in these subgraphs.
Definition 2 (Equivalence). Graphs Gr1 and Gr2 are equiv-
alent (Gr1 ≡ Gr2 ) ⇔ ∀(s6=r1,p,o 6=r1) ∈ Gr1 ∃(s6=r2,p,o 6=r2)
1In the sake of simplicity, we omit prefix and datatype declarations in all
the examples.
∈ Gr2 ∧ ∀(r1,p,o) ∈ Gr1 ∃(r2,p,o) ∈ Gr2 ∧ ∀(s,p,r1) ∈ Gr1
∃(s,p,r2) ∈ Gr2 .
Definition 3. In an RDF graph G, with QID(G) we denote
a set of QID attributes that describe any entity of interest
represented by a resource in G.
Definition 4. A subgraph Gr of an RDF graph G describes
an entity of interest represented by a resource r with respect
to QID(G), written Gr(QID(G)), if Gr includes information
about all QID attributes.
Definition 5 (k-RDFanonymity). Let I be a set of resources
that represent entities of interest described in an RDF graph
G, and let QID(G) be a set of QID attributes that describe
these entities of interest. kRDF-anonymity in G is satisfied
⇔ ∀Gr(QID(G)) ∈ G, r ∈ I, ∃rs ∈ I, s ∈ [1,k-1] ⇒
∀Grs(QID(G)) ∈ G, Grs ≡ Gr. An RDF graph that satisfies
this premised is called k-RDFanonymous.
In a k-RDFanonymous graph, each resource r that represents
an entity of interest cannot be distinguished from k-1 other
resources that represent entities of interest in a graph with
respect to QID(G). Therefore, the probability of identifying a
specific resource based on resource descriptions with respect
to QID(G) is 1/k.
C. RDF Anonymisation Operations
This section presents different anonymisation operations that
can be used for implementing the k-RDFanonymity model.
These operations are based on the anonymisation operations
presented in Section II-A and address private attributes, i.e.,
explicit identifiers, quasi identifiers, and sensitive attributes.
1) Generalisation and Suppression: In the context of RDF,
suppression denotes that a resource (i.e., an IRI or literal) is
completely removed or replaced with some specific resource
while the original replaced resource is not disclosed in any way.
Generalisation denotes that the original resource is replaced
with other resource that describes a more general concept.
The starting point of generalisation and suppression is a
domain generalisation hierarchy of a an attribute, in which the
elements of the hierarchy are resources that represent attribute
values (i.e., that include information about that attribute). Figure
1 shows generalisation hierarchies for the Age attribute (literals),
the Job attribute (IRIs representing a class from a specific
vocabulary), and the Disease attribute (properties).
While generalisation implies the use of more general
resources from a hierarchy (e.g., ex:Job instead of ex:Musician),
suppression implies the complete removal of a resource or the
use of the resource at the top of the hierarchy (e.g., owl:Thing
instead of ex:Musician).
Since resources that include information about explicit
identifiers unequivocally identify entities of interest, these
resources have to be suppressed, while resources that include
information about QID and sensitive attributes can be gener-
alised or suppressed, depending on the concrete scenario. Next,
we describe generalisation and suppression through different
scenarios depending on the position in which resources that
include information about explicit identifiers, QID and sensitive
“28”	  
“2x”	  
“xx”	  
“35”	  
“3x”	  
ex:Teacher	   ex:Lawyer	  
ex:Professional	  
ex:Job	  
ex:Musician	   ex:Writer	  
ex:ArAst	  
	  owl:Thing	  
“24”	   “32”	  
owl:topDataProperty	  
ex:hasHIV	  
ex:hasDisease	  
rdfs:subClassOf	  
rdfs:subClassOf	  
rdfs:subClassOf	  
rdfs:subPropertyOf	  
rdfs:subPropertyOf	  
Fig. 1: Generalisation hierarchies for Age (left), Job (center) and Disease (right).
attributes appear in the description of a resource that represents
an entity of interest (Section III-A):
• Resource IRI. If a resource that includes information about
an explicit identifier appears in the IRI of the resource
that represents an entity of interest, it cannot be simply
removed from the graph because it would result in the
loss of connections between nodes. Therefore, it has to be
suppressed by replacing the original IRI with another one.
This can be achieved through: i) simple replacement of the
IRI with some arbitrary IRI. In this case, the uniqueness
of each IRI has to be ensured; ii) encoding of the IRI by
using encryption or hashing. In this case, the encryption
or hashing function should ensure that the original IRI
cannot be easily recovered, and that new IRI is unique;
or iii) replacing the IRI node with a blank node. In this
case, the original resource that includes information about
the explicit identifier is suppressed and the original IRI
is not disclosed.
Resources that include information about QID and sen-
sitive attributes that appear in the IRIs of resources
that represent entities of interest can be addressed by
generalising or suppressing the original IRIs, using the
previously defined domain generalisation hierarchies.
It is important to note that generalisation and suppression
of IRIs breaks the uniqueness of the IRIs in a graph. This
can be solved by introducing additional unique identifier
values as part of the IRI of each resource.
• Property values. Resources that include information about
explicit identifiers that appear either as datatype or
as object property values are addressed by complete
suppression, i.e., by removing property values from the
graph. Resources that include information about QID and
sensitive attributes that appear either as datatype or as
object property values can be addressed by generalising or
suppressing the original resources that appear as property
values. In some cases, this operation has to be supported
by the vocabulary design.
• Property IRI. Resources that include information about
QID and sensitive attributes that appear as property IRIs
can be addressed by generalisation through the use of
super-properties.
Listing 2 presents an example of applying generalisation
and suppression on the RDF data presented in Listing 1. The
resource that includes information about the explicit identifier is
addressed by suppressing the original IRI with another one. Age
(which is described as a datatype property value and includes
information about a QID attribute), job (which is described as
an object property value and also includes information about a
QID attribute), and disease (which is described as a property
IRI and includes information about a sensitive attribute) are
addressed by generalising by one level in the generalisation
hierarchy.
1 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per01> a foaf:Person;
2 foaf:age "2x"; ex:hasJob ex:Professional;
3 ex:hasDisease "true".
Listing 2: Example of generalisation and suppression in RDF.
Since generalisation reduces the semantic precision of
information and since for an RDF graph G there can be multiple
generalisations, different generalisations of an RDF graph G are
characterised by different semantic precisions of information.
Definition 7 (Graph generalisation). An RDF graph Gg is
a generalisation of an RDF graph G with respect to QID(G),
written Gg(QID(G)) ≥ G(QID(G)), if some or all resources
that include information about QID attributes in a graph G are
generalised.
Definition 8 (kRDF-minimal generalisation). Let an
RDF graph Gg be a generalisation of an RDF graph G
with respect to QID(G). Gg(QID(G)) is said to be the k-
RDFminimal generalisation of an RDF graph G with respect
to QID(G) ⇔ Gg(QID(G)) is a k-RDFanonymous graph ∧
∀Gi(QID(G)): Gi(QID(G)) ≥ G(QID(G)), Gg(QID(G)) ≥
Gi(QID(G)), Gi(QID(G)) is a k-RDFanonymous graph ⇒
Gg(QID(G)) ≡ Gi(QID(G)).
2) Anatomisation: In the context of RDF, anatomisation
implies that resources that include information about sensitive
attributes are not directly connected to resources ri that
represent entities of interest. Instead, resources that include
information about sensitive attributes are grouped into several
groups which describe how many resources ri belong to each
group. All resources ri are then connected to these groups.
This way, for each resource ri it is known to which group
it belongs to and, hence, it is only known with how many
other resources that represent entities of interest ri shares the
sensitive information from a particular group.
Listing 3 shows an example of applying anatomisation on
the RDF data presented in Listing 1.
From the previously described graph, for any disease group
there is only information about how many patients have each
disease. Therefore, for any resource (patient) it is not explicitly
known which disease is associated with it.
1 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per01> a foaf:Person;
2 foaf:age "24"; ex:hasJob ex:Teacher;
3 ex:inGroup <http://example.com/resource/Group/01>.
4 <http://example.com/resource/Group/01> a ex:DiseaseGroup;
5 ex:hasDisease <http://example.com/resource/Disease/X>;
6 ex:hasDisease <http://example.com/resource/Disease/Y>.
7 <http://example.com/resource/Disease/X> a ex:Disease;
8 ex:name "HIV"; ex:cardinality "4".
9 <http://example.com/resource/Disease/Y> a ex:Disease;
10 ex:name "Flu"; ex:cardinality "4".
Listing 3: Example of anatomisation in RDF.
3) Perturbation: In the context of RDF, perturbation is an
operation which replaces original resources in such a way
that the semantics of resources affected is also changed, while
preserving the statistical information of the original RDF graph.
This can be achieved by: i) adding noise to the RDF data in
such a way that the semantics of data is changed; ii) swapping
resources by assigning to a resource that represents an entity of
interest the description of some other resource that represents
another entity of interest; or iii) generating synthetic resources.
Listing 4 presents an example of applying perturbation on
the RDF data presented in Listing 1. In this example, noise has
been introduced to the resource describing age, while resources
describing job and disease have been swapped.
1 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per01> a foaf:Person;
2 foaf:age "22"; ex:hasJob ex:Musician; ex:hasFlu "true".
Listing 4: Example of perturbation in RDF.
D. RDF Information Metrics
In the situation where for a given RDF graph there exist
multiple k-RDFanonymous graphs, the decision on which k-
RDFanonymous graph is the best to use for privacy protection
can be a difficult task. In order to provide information that
can help in making this decision, we have defined RDFprec,
a precision metric of a k-RDFanonymous graph. This metric
is based on the precision metric for tabular data developed
by Sweeney [8] and can be used for defining the minimal
distortion of an RDF graph.
Definition 9. With DGHai we denote a domain generalisa-
tion hierarchy of an attribute ai which describes an entity of
interest represented by a resource. With |DGHai | we denote
the number of levels in DGHai , where the lowest level in
a hierarchy is level 0. With vij we denote a resource which
includes information about the value of an attribute ai, and
which describes an entity of interest represented by a resource
rj . With h(vij) we denote a height of a resource vij in DGHai ,
where a resource vij at the lowest level in the hierarchy has
height 0. With |r| we denote the number of resources r that
represent entities of interest in a graph G, i.e., those resources
that have to be anonymised.
An example of a domain generalisation hierarchy is shown on
Figure 1. In this example, in the case of a resource that describes
age there are 2 levels, while in the case of a resource that
describes jobs there are 3 levels in the domain generalisation
hierarchy. Resource “2x” is on the first level in the hierarchy.
Definition 10 (RDFprec). Let G be an RDF graph, Gg be
a generalisation of G, vij be a generalised resource from Gg
which includes information about the value of an attribute
ai and which describes an entity of interest represented by a
resource rj , DGHai be the domain generalisation hierarchy
of an attribute ai, na be the number of generalised attributes,
and mi be the number of entities of interest represented by
resources rj in which a resource that includes information
about an attribute ai is generalised. The precision of Gg , written
RDFprec(Gg) is defined with the following formula:
RDFprec(Gg) = 1−
∑na
i=1
∑mi
j=1
h(vij)
|DGHai |
|r| ∗ na
If all resources in an RDF graph Gg are generalised to
the highest level in a domain generalisation hierarchy, each
h(vij) = |DGHai | and RDFprec(Gg) = 0. Contrary, if there
are no resources that are generalised, each h(vij) = 0 and the
RDFprec(Gg) = 1.
As an example, precision of the example RDF graph G
presented in Listing 2, which consists of only one resource
that represents an entity of interest, with respect to the domain
generalisation hierarchy on Figure 1 is
RDFprec(G) = 1− 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/2
1 ∗ 3 =
5
9
Definition 11 - RDF minimal distortion. Let an RDF graph
Gg be a generalisation of an RDF graph G with respect to
QID(G). Gg(QID(G)) is said to be the RDFminimal distortion
of an RDF graph G with respect to QID(G) ⇔ Gg(QID(G))
is a k-RDFanonymous graph ∧ ∀Gi(QID(G)): RDFprec(G) ≥
RDFprec(Gi), RDFprec(Gi) ≥ RDFprec(Gg), Gi(QID(G)) is a
k-RDFanonymous graph ⇒ Gg(QID(G)) ≡ Gi(QID(G)).
IV. USE OF THE RDF ANONYMISATION FRAMEWORK
This section presents a use case of the RDF anonymisation
framework presented in this paper. In this use case, we examine
different generalisations of an RDF graph G that describes the
medical records presented in Table I, based on the domain
generalisation hierarchies presented in Figure 1.
For graph G six different suppressions and five different
generalisations are possible. In this example, we focus only on
generalisations that are addressed through a generalisation of
the QID attributes, which include Job and Age.
The original RDF graph G with no generalisation, written
G[0,0], describes the values for the Job and Age attributes at
the lowest (zero) level in the domain generalisation hierarchies,
and corresponds to the data in Table I. In this case, the k
constraint is 0 and RDFprec(G[0,0]) = 1. Listing 5 shows the
excerpt of the original graph G[0,0] which includes information
about teachers and lawyers.
Possible generalisations of graph G are: G[0,1] (meaning
Job is not generalised while Age is generalised by one level),
G[1,0], G[1,1], G[2,0], and G[2,1]. Graphs G[0,1], G[1,1], and G[2,1]
are k-RDFanonymous for k=2, while G[1,0] and G[2,0] are not
k-RDFanonymous since in these cases k = 0.
1 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per01> a foaf:Person;
2 foaf:age "24"; ex:hasJob ex:Teacher; ex:hasHIV "true".
3 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per02> a foaf:Person;
4 foaf:age "28"; ex:hasJob ex:Lawyer; ex:hasFlu "true".
5 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per06> a foaf:Person;
6 foaf:age "22"; ex:hasJob ex:Lawyer; ex:hasFlu "true".
7 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per07> a foaf:Person;
8 foaf:age "25"; ex:hasJob ex:Teacher; ex:hasHIV "true".
Listing 5: Excerpt of the original graph with no generalisation.
Listing 6 presents the excerpt of the generalisation graph
G[0,1] related to the excerpt presented in Listing 5. We can
observe that, for any given combination of resources that
include information about the Job and Age attributes, there are
two resources that represent patients that are described with
that same combination. For example, Per01 and Per07 are both
teachers that are between 20 and 30 years old, and they both
have HIV. Similarly, Per02 and Per06 are both lawyers that
are between 20 and 30 years old, and they both have flu.
1 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per01> a foaf:Person;
2 foaf:age "2x"; ex:hasJob ex:Teacher; ex:hasHIV "true".
3 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per02> a foaf:Person;
4 foaf:age "2x"; ex:hasJob ex:Lawyer; ex:hasFlu "true".
5 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per06> a foaf:Person;
6 foaf:age "2x"; ex:hasJob ex:Lawyer; ex:hasFlu "true".
7 <http://example.com/resource/Person/Per07> a foaf:Person;
8 foaf:age "2x"; ex:hasJob ex:Teacher; ex:hasHIV "true".
Listing 6: Excerpt of a generalisation of the original graph – G[0,1].
Among the three 2-RDFanonymous graphs, G[0,1] generalises
Age by one level, G[1,1] generalises both Job and Age by one
level, and G[2,1] generalises Job by two levels and Age by one
level. Furthermore, since G[1,1] is generalisation of G[0,1], and
G[2,1] is a generalisation of both G[1,1] and G[0,1], G[0,1] is the
k-RDFminimal generalisation of G.
Since there are three generalisation graphs that are 2-
RDFanonymous, by calculating RDFprec for each graph it can
be determined which of the three graphs has minimal distortion.
In this use case, RDFprec(G[0,1]) = 0.75, RDFprec(G[1,1]) =
0.58, and RDFprec(G[2,1]) = 0.42. Therefore, the RDFminimal
distortion of a graph G that satisfies 2-RDFanonymity is G[0,1].
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has presented a framework for the anonymisation
of RDF data that addresses the particularities of the RDF
specification and can help in preserving the privacy of entities
of interest in RDF data sets. Such framework describes an
anonymisation model, several anonymisation operations, and
an anonymisation metric.
The anonymisation model presented in this paper helps in
preserving the privacy of RDF data sets. However, in order to
ensure the maximum possible protection of privacy in RDF data
by implementing such anonymisation model, it is first necessary
to correctly identify resources that include information about
QID and sensitive attributes, which is a difficult task. In
those cases when these resources are not correctly identified,
anonymisation can lead to an overprotection of the RDF data
(i.e., lowering the precision of the anonymised data) or to a
failure in ensuring the privacy of the RDF data.
The anonymisation model presented in this paper, although it
ensures the protection of privacy to a certain level, is vulnerable
to different kinds of attacks, such as in those cases when the
order of entities of interest can compromise their privacy, or
when subsequent releases of the same private information take
place. Therefore, future work includes additional formalisations
and recommendations on the implementation of the model to
address those potential issues. These formalisations can be
based on future case studies that will investigate the strength
of the anonymisation model.
The framework for the anonymisation of RDF data described
in this paper presents an initial effort towards the privacy
protection of RDF data. Therefore, one line of future work
consists of enriching the anonymisation framework described
in this paper with other anonymisation models, besides the
one presented in this paper, which can be based on the already
existing set of models developed for tabular data. Furthermore,
future work consists of including into the RDF anonymisation
framework additional anonymisation metrics, and development
of anonymisation algorithms. A variety of anonymisation mod-
els, metrics, and algorithms can help in achieving better privacy
protection and will provide a comprehensive anonymisation
framework for the privacy protection of RDF data.
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